The Postmodern Spirit and the Status of God
In this essay, I propose to consider the status of the concept of God in light of the postmodern spirit. After characterizing the nature of this postmodern spirit, I will identify three options regarding the idea of God, arguing for the superiority of one of these.
I. The Postmodern Spirit
In my article, "Discerning the Spirits of Modernity and Postmodernity", I have claimed that the "controlling picture" or basic assumption of postmodernity is that a person is always standing in the world, with at least "one foot in" one's body, temporality, language, society, culture, history, tradition, etc.
This contrasts with modernity's controlling assumption that the individual can leave behind all limitations of one's body and perceptual equipment, temporality, language, and culture and reach an absolutely privileged position where one can "see" everything, including oneself, with total clarity. Some ramifications of this postmodern spirit are: 1) Epistemologically someone knowing or perceiving something is the only starting point. Neither mind/subject or body/object is an absolute or privileged starting point. The attempt to reach a subject in itself (in total distinctness from any object known) or an object in f (in total distinctioness from any subject knowing and relating. Here body is understood not as something split from mind nor simply physical, but as correlative with consciousness. A person is rather a mindbodily continuum.
"Mind", as being aware of and attempting to make sense of things, and "body", as that with which we have and relate to a world are not simply distinguishable but are radically interrelated, and both come into play at some level in all our acts.
II. The Three Types
I find in contemporary theology and philosophy of religion three types of response sympathetic to the postmodern spirit regarding the viability of the concept of God. In brief these responses are: 1) minimalist conceptions of God; 2) denial of the concept of God, the "death of God"; 3) fairly traditional conceptions of God.
Given the wariness of the postmodern spirit about grand claims to knowledge, is not surprising that some philosophers of religion and theologians are offering minimalist conceptions of "God." One such thinker, a senior statesman on the theological scene, Gordon Kaufman, has moved from more traditional understandings of God. In his latest work, In Face of Mystery, Kaufman identifies God with "serendipitous creativity" (especially, 264-80) . Kaufman opts against attributing to God personality, consciousness in any sense, intentionality, or agency 329) . This is in contrast to earlier work that characterizes divine creativity in terms of an overarching "act" (Kaufman, 1968:50-56) . Kaufman even expresses an unwillingness to assign any actual transcendence to God, finding it sufficient to identify God with, or as wholly within, the cosmic process (1993: 271-72)1. There are, however, some countervailing tendenc where some transcendence seems to come in through the back door, as when Kaufman speaks of God as "ground [ing] " (296), "underlying"
(330), "behind" (297, 418), "unifying" (418), "expressing itself"
(296, 417), or "working" (297, 330, 339, 415) in and through processes, all reality. In this minimalist project Kaufman hopes to reconstruct the concept of God so that both theists and nontheists who find the universe conducive to life and its fillment can find common ground as to an ultimate concept.
In a similar vein to Kaufman, Sallie MCFague dec in
Models of God that all Christianity claims "with any assurance" about ultimate reality is that it is supportive of life and its fillment, and she parenthetically adds--claiming more than Kaufman-that this power is "personal" (x The above kinds of minimalist conceptions of God are attractive in avoiding both modern absolutism and relativism (the latter following from the failure to realize absolute knowledge and presence). They also are conducive to the postmodern concern to respect "otherness", in granting that other religious--and secular--traditions are compatible with the most basic Christian or metaphysical claims. These conceptions do retain something of the basic western notion of God; though, the cruc question is whether they retain enough of that meaning to be judged a development of rather than an alternative to the concept of God.
Minimalists can point to the negative theological tradition and to a traditional idea that we can only know God in relation to us, but not in God's self. On the other hand, thinkers of the via negativa, in affirming the divine infinity, unity, and transcendence have claimed much more than the minimalists.
Parenthetically, I do wonder if Sallie McFague would spend so much time developing symbols for God if she truly believed these told us nothing about the nature of ultimate reality but were only socially useful.
More traditional conceptions of God provide an explanation of the universe--regarding it as caused by a conscious, intentional, and integrated reality--while minimalist conceptions attempt to be only or mainly descriptive of the universe. For those who feel the universe is amenable to an ultimate explanation, minimalist ideas will obviously be inadequate.
I believe it is an uncontroversial claim that the large majority of contemporary theistic believers would find minimalistic ideas not to correspond sufficiently to what they mean by "God." However, the question of whether most future believers in the Christian and Western traditions will understand "God" in terms of "minimalist" conceptions is still to be decided --and minimalist thinkers are arguing that in light of the postmodern spirit this is the direction in which the concept of "God" should be modified. Later I will argue my position that the concept of God does not need to be changed so radically to be viable for an emergent postmodern age. Reacting radically against modernity's picture of absolute transcendence, such thinkers take postmodern insight to entail the total immanence of a person in one's experiences: we are immersed in our perceptions, our words, our interpretations, our representations, our constructions of reality--and there is nothing more, at least that is knowable.
While "God" is dead, these radical thinkers do not necessarily eschew some notion of divinity. Even as the person is wholly immanent in one's body and experiences, so divinity may be wholly immanent with respect to the world--even more so than in any traditional pantheism. Taylor writes of "the ever-never changing-same [that] is the eternally recurring play of the divine milieu in which all things [emphasis his] arise and pass away" (1984: 112-20, 183 ). Leahy exalts, "As never before the divine flows absolutely. In this flow every notion of self is completely dissolved" (786). Such immanentalism which affirms the interconnected totality of all that has or will transpire is in tension with an attitude of ironic relativism toward the various interpretations or constructions of reality in which individuals are immanent (an attitude that tends toward nihilism). It appears that radical immanentalism can avoid the standing nowhere of nihilism only by trying to stand everywhere. In works after
Erring, by the way, Mark C. Taylor backs off from a divine immanentalism, sensing the totalizing tendencies of its backdoor retrieval of immediacy and full presence (e.g., 1991: 1-34).
We come now to the third type, those acknowledging the postmodern spirit, but retaining a fairly traditional idea of God 2 :
In varieties of Postmodern Theology, David Griffin recommends process theology's conception of God as especially appropriate to the postmodern spirit. It is certainly the case that the temporality and the interconnectedness, correlativity, and sociality of life that the postmodern spirit firms find in process thought counterparts in the nature of God: God has a genuinely temporal dimension in relating to the world and God affected by the creatures who are in some sense a part of God. On the other hand, in two ways process theology seems more modern than postermodern: 1) Its theories that gll reality consists of "occasions of experience" and that gll causation, including divine agency with respect to the world, consists of the prehension of past occasions of experience by present ones smack of modern 2r will here mention those known as postliberal thinkers. Though coming from the conservative side, they share with the radical postmodernists an emphasis on human immanence in particular "cultural-linguistic" frameworks (Lindbeck) . However, after affirming the postmodern spirit and both the self authenticating and apparently somewhat relativizing contextuality of Christianity and other world views, postliberals go on to claim for Christianity alone an absolute connection with God, an exclusive revelation from an extra cultural-linguistic reality. Thus a traditional, particularist vision of God emphasizing divine freedom and transcendence is affirmed, where God chooses to reveal God's self in a particular tradition in lieu of a more universal immanence (while human freedom and transcendence are downplayed or denied). Often postliberals explicitly eschew the tasks of philosophy of religion, natural theology, or apologetic theology. However, in appealing to postmodern logic, postliberals are implicitly offering an epistemological defense of their right to hold a very traditional idea of God, though, as r have argued, not consistently or effectively. 
III. The Inevitability of Metaphysics
Preliminary to that, however, there are some metaphysical and epistemological issues to consider. Some will presume that, given the limitations on human knowing recognized by the postmodern spirit, either the minimal or radical perspective is credible, while more traditional conceptions of deity can no longer be plausibly defended. I will argue otherwise.
3E.g., Nicolai Berdyaev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. John MacQuarrie, Hans Jonas, Matthew Fox.
To lead into these considerations, I will offer an observation relative to our preceding discussion. All three types share an emphasis on immanence in comparison to the relative emphasis on transcendence of classical theist models. The radicals do away with all transcendence, the minimalists allow just a hint of it, whi "traditionalists" affirm a substantial measure of transcendence. On one level, minimalists and radicals may evidence cognitive humility; however, to deny transcendence and make the ultimate more or less equivalent to the (processes of) the universe is in fact a definitive stand that claims much.
While any transcendent aspect of the ultimate may be more difficult to know compared to an immanent aspect more immediately connected to observation of the universe, to more or less deny the reality of a transcendent dimension is hardly humble. A more "humble" position would be to say we can neither affirm nor deny anything regarding divine transcendence; nor can we say much, if anything, about immanent ultimacy or deity nor about the purposes and integrity of the universe, in as much as we are ignorant of the relationship, if any, of divine immanence to transcendence.
The above hints that the eschewal of metaphysics by radicals and some other thinkers is not humble--nor successful. Far from being impossible since Kant's critique, metaphysics, while problematic, is inevitable. Every position or worldview involves beliefs and assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality and the nature of ultimate reality. To say that metaphysics is impossible itself claims something significant about the nature of our universe--namely that the universe is so constituted that the ultimate nature of things is unknowable.
Deconstructionists are rather specific in their "knowing"
claims about the unknowability of things, claims that are not merely epistemological, but metaphysical; e.g. 1) no cognitive closure is possible; 2) there is no "reality", all is interpretation, representation. 4
The postmodern perspective holds that meaning is contextual, temporal, and to a great extent, tacit; a corollary of this in that when we attempt to represent, reflect upon, or make explicit an experience, there is no absolute "translation"; rather there is always some distancing or gap between referrent and signifier.
Derrida refers to the phenomena that representations never absolutely capture "reality" by the rubric differance. In Derrida's thought differance seems (almost?) reified and, in any case, functions like an overarching metaphysical category that includes the judgment that meaning is very unstable.
Some who are more traditional, like Marion and Kaspar, try to sidestep metaphysics by speaking of God in terms of "love" and "freedom", rather than of "being". Whatever the value of this move may be, they are still maintaining an infinite and ultimate reality, necessary and absolute in some sense, that is the creator 4For the postmodern spirit, in light of the inexhaustibility and temporality of life and creaturely fallibility, there is no absolute closure. Yet most creatures achieve adeguate cognitive closure and determinacy most of the time, according to a moderate postmodern perspective.
of the world. Clearly there are definite metaphysical commitments here, too, even if some of the terminology is more "biblical" than "philosophical". What is impossible and wrongheaded is the enlightenment absolutism that assumed we can establish neutral, universal metaphysical beliefs that all "reasonable" people will subscribe to. Given the plurality of metaphysical perspectives, Taylor (1987) . Combining immanentalism with irreducible alterity might lead to a solipsistic conclusion.
However, in practice, radical postmodernism has not denied our knowing other human beings. Rather, it has held only that much about other persons must remain "other" to us. While agreeing with the substance of this conclusion, I demur from the tone of 5John caputo has recently argued that Derrida's emphasis on aterity gainsays interpretations of Derrida that entail our entrapment in language (or better, all our constructions of meaning). While I have noted the tension here, believe this tension is clearly present in the work of Derrida and other deconstructionists (e.g., Derrida, 298). My thesis is that we likewise know God through our--and God's embodiment in the world. If we grant the dualism between God in ation to world and in God's own self, we have already lost the epistemological ball game to the agnostic and atheistic interpreters of Heidegger. For if God in relation to the world divine immanence--cannot disclose anything about God's self or nature, that is, at least something of the value and purpose of creation for God, then indeed we have no right to postulate anything transcending the processes of the cosmos. But if we allow the possibility of some continuity or connection between God in relation to world and God's self and intentionality, knowledge about the world (divine immanence) may yield some knowledge of the divine self or nature as more than world. Granted there is a distinction between the subjectivity-objectivity correlation in the world on the one hand and that which is prior to creaturely subjectivity-objectivity on the other. Yet I see no justification to a priori preclude knowing something about the initiator of the "differentiating process of being" by means of those processes of being. Panentheism, in particular (which shortly will be more fully expounded), offers a model where God is partially differentiated or distinguished from creation, but is not subject to the differentiating process in the way the creatures are, for
God initiates, controls, and encompasses that process; thus, God is both immanent in and transcendent of that process. Because God is prior to that process, it can be part of God and God can be part of it.
Some radical postmodernists, such as Charles Winquist, have made a more particular disclaimer of the possibility of knowledge of God. They have maintained that theological claims are wholly within a culture and language, and so cannot hope to refer to any transcendent reality. This seems to me a rather weak argument.
Language and culture are continually changing, yet we are quite capable of partially transcending a given version of these in understanding new versions. Moreover, I submit we can have some understanding of other cultures and religions (albeit we do not understand these exactly as natives do). Furthermore, I submit that we can have some understanding of meaning for animals who are not part of any human language or culture (albe our culture has some effect on our interpretation of these meanings). If we can partially transcend our cultural-linguistic frameworks to know something of these various others, there is no a priori reason to deny we may do so with respect to ultimate reality. God directly knows all that happens, all the joys and sorrows, the goods and ills of the world, and the divine beatitude If in the postmodern spirit we rule out any absolute or unmediated human connection with God, then I submit that how we know God should not differ in principle from how we know other realities. As I have indicated, for the postmodern spir knowing is bodily knowing. Here body not discontinuous with mind. Some knowing is relatively reflective; other knowing more pre-reflective. All our knowing, however, is through our and others' embodiment in the world. Therefore, as I suggested earlier, whatever knowledge we have of God will come from our and God's embodiment in the world.
Even as we know the reality and intentions of others through the processes and actions of their bodies, so the world's processes and activities are interpreted as the body of God that gives us knowledge of the reality and intentions of God-including the intention that there be sentient, conscious, valuing life.
The universe is regarded as a body supporting life, providing order--or a proper mix of regularity and chance, and creating beauty. Some of this knowledge will be relatively reflective, such as 1) the Big Bang and the evolution of stars, planets, and li ; 2) the balance of atmospheric composition, pressure, and movement, of temperatures of ocean, land, and air, etc., that provide an environment conducive to the preservation of life.
Some of this knowledge will be relatively pre-reflective, such as an intuition of God's purpose in viewing the beauty of a sunset or in the experience of pregnancy and birthing. S This paragraph has been meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive as to how we might discern God as embodied the world. One's sense of God and the world here must be cumulative and integrative or holistic.
It is an interpretation of the whole of one's embodied existence.
Clearly the universe contains many particular instances of evil.
The theist will likely interpret this as an inevitable dimension of powerful, yet fragile, processes that assure the good the whole. The theist then will have an overall evaluation of the world as good and purposeful, though taking into account the many negativities of existence.
8Clearly this model for knowing God has similarities to traditional teleological arguments for God's existence. Perhaps the main departure or innovation is the intimacy of the perceived connection between God and the world's processes with a panentheistic understanding of the world as God's body. A similarity to traditional cosmological arguments can also be drawn. If "body" is split from "mind", that is, if the world is split from divine awareness and purpose, then the world is only physical and its existence is simply and absolutely contingent. This leaves the existence of an integrated world, of something rather than nothing, wholly unexplained.
If instead God is understood as necessarily existent, the integration of the universe is explained as correlative with the integration of divine awareness and intentionality.
Obviously my model of knowing God's intentions through the actions of God's body focuses on general processes; it relates to "general" rather than "particular" providence. Someone might want to argue that particular events, such as the crossing of the Red Sea by the Israelites, are actions of God's body through which we discern God's intentions.
Perhaps such a model could be reconciled to the postmodern spirit by claiming that particular revelations are never unambiguous or certain. While allowing that some events or persons or texts may be revelatory of God's nature, I nevertheless cannot accept them as actions by God. Even if construed as not involving supernatural intervention, creaturely indeterminacy and freedom must be kept within very narrow bounds, if present at all, to maintain that God is agential in, and responsible for, these events beyond God's general activity in and empowerment of every event. And then we are left with the question of why God is especially responsible for foreplanning and causing these particular, admittedly ambiguous events, but not all other particular events.
We cannot legitimately doubt that we know persons' intentions through their bodily actions. While we may be wrong in our reading of particular actions and intentions, practically speaking we cannot generally doubt this kind of knowing--and certainly not the existence of other embodied persons--unless one creates a philosophical problem under the influence of the spirit of modernity or is emotionally disturbed.
Is our knowing through God's embodiment equally certain?
Alvin Plantinga has labelled beliefs in the existence both of other minds and of God as "properly basic" (Plantinga).9 Clearly, many in secular society and in nontheistic religions doubt the existence of a God who is discernible in and through the world.
Even as a confirmed theist, I would hardly claim that my knowing If this is so, the question remains as to how much we can plausibly claim to know about the God embodied in the world. I have thus far suggested that we can discern God as creator and 9John V. Apczynski has recently made, I think, a convincing case that "proper basicality" must be understood as within a particular historical tradition of inquiry, in Plantinga's case, the Reformed tradition of Christianity. Yet would want to ask about the models of knowing that historically have led to belief in God as properly basic in that tradition. One model has involved belief in absolute and self-authenticating supernatural revelation. Another model, controversial as an interpretation of Calvin and the Reformed tradition, posits a direct "awareness of divinity", albeit obscured by sin (Plantinga: 65). Of course, both models are suspect for the postmodern spirit. Another model involves discerning God's existence and intentions through observing the world, which I obviously accept as a viable option, even though not so properly basic as our knowledge of other persons. I valuer of sentient life. But can this model of the world as God's body support knowledge of a God who is conscious, knowing all that has transpired to this point, immediately empowering the being of the world, and whose existence is necessary--or can it at best support a more minimalist conception? If one admits the discernibility of any intentionality or purposefulness in the world (beyond that possessed by the individual creatures), one is, I think, admitting that God is conscious or intentional--or ~ ~than conscious or intentional (if one pre this latter wording, I have no objection). However, if one balks at the discernibility of intentionality, I would submit that the existence of conscious, intentional beings in the universe is best explained by a conscious, intentional God of whose body these other beings are part--while such beings arising from a universe that is as a whole nonconscious and nonintentional is incongruous.
If it is thus granted that a conscious, intentional God has played a causative role in this universe's existence, I judge it to be at t plausible that this God is both desirous and capable of knowing whatever happens in this universe.
What of the panentheistic intimacy of the world to Godincluding an immediate empowerment of the world? All three postmodern responses focus on the universe in framing ultimacy.
Given this focus and given that our method, our heuristic model, for knowing God is postulating the universe as God's body, if we find evidence for a conscious, intentional, causative, knowing
God, a great degree of immanence of the world with respect to God must be firmed. But must there be an absence of externality, save for the indeterminate freedom of the creatures? Certainly in the human case, there is much about one's body that is outside one's awareness, intentionality, and control. However, in sensing the world as God's body, there is a sense of the ultimacy or holiness of the whole that is the embodied God. It is this sense of ultimacy that will not brook externality of God's power and knowledge with respect to God's body, the world. Yet we also sense that not all is as it ought to be in God's body. In or despite the immediacy of divine presence to the universe, God permits and empowers a significant amount of chance, spontaneity, indeterminate freedom in parts of God's body.l0 Thus while divine presence, knowledge, and empowerment are immediate, divine intentionality is partly permissive and divine control is far from total (and divine knowing does not foresee future creaturely decisions to the extent these are indeterminate).
Finally, the necessary existence of God is implicit in the sense of ultimacy and is correlative with panentheistic immediacy.
Positively, only a God who possesses its own power of existence would be capable of immediate presence to all se that exists.
Negatively, positing the externality of the world with respect to God implies a "God above God", to use a Tillichian phrase, who includes and empowers both this supposed God and the creatures, On my model, the including whole is immediately aware of the included parts. However, the converse does not hold. We are an immediate part of God, but God is not similarly an immediate part of us, even in attenuated form.
As I have suggested, whatever knowledge we have of God is mediated, even as is our knowledge of creaturely others (and many would hold, even our knowledge of our own bodies, emotions, etc.).
In the case of other creatures, it is particular aspects of the world, particular embodiment(s) that enable knowledge. In the case of God, it is the whole universe as embodiment that enables knowledge. This involves mediation and interpretation of a different order than our knowledge of particular or fragmentary entit It is a holistic or integrative interpretation that makes a judgment based on what knowledge one has of the whole universe. To be sure many particular experiences and elements inform such judgment (for example, I earlier mentioned somewhat particular processs conducive to life). However, none of these in themselves are taken as immediately, uniquely, or decisively revelatory of God. Rather they are part of a contextual interpretation of the nature of the universe and of the one who is embodied in the universe. If one does not allow the possibility of God acting or revealing God's self in exclusive, particular ways, then one must make a judgment as to the absence or presence of God based upon an overall judgment about the nature of our universe.
In this article I have argued that the nature of the universe is epistemologically consistent with the model of the world as the body of God, God being conceived in a fairly traditional manner, but with significant modifications to reflect a full-fledged panentheism.
